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HOW RELEVANT IS JURY 
RATIONALITY? 
David A. Hoffman* 
Review of Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide by Cass R. Sun-
stein, Reid Hastie, John W. Payne, David A. Schkade, and W. Kip Vis-
cusi, with an introduction by George L. Priest, University of Chicago 
Press (2002). 
In the last ten years, law professors have spent ever increasing 
amounts of time worrying if ordinary people have their heads “screwed 
on right.”1  Some scholars, relying on a new set of data loosely labeled 
 
 * Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.  Clerk to the Hon. Norma L. Shapiro, U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2001–2002.  B.A. 1998, Yale; J.D. 2001, Harvard. 
I am grateful to Professors Douglas Kysar and Daniel Filler for their encouragement and thought-
ful commentary on an earlier draft.  Michael P. O’Shea and Dimitri Pappas both provided excellent edit-
ing advice.  I am indebted to my family and friends for their support; for inspiration, I look to Deborah 
Tillie Hoffman Filler.  The views presented are mine alone, as are any errors. 
 1. Richard Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law: A Com-
ment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 563 (1998).  Posner argues that the implicit message of so-called behav-
ioralist scholars like Cass Sunstein is that people are irrational.  For a thoughtful description of how 
Posner’s conceptions of what is “rational” relate to traditional economic theories, and new cognitive 
research, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147 
(2000).  The assumption that individuals always act to maximize their expected utility (the narrowest 
definition of rationality) had been under attack in the field of economics even before law and econom-
ics gained its current status.  See Paul Slovic et al., Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to 
Natural Hazards, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 1, 3–6 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (describing criticism of 
theory of expected utility dating from the 1950s); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the 
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 317–24 (1977) (criticizing the 
rationality assumption of mainstream economics). 
In this essay, when I speak of the “rationality debate,” or the debate about whether individuals have 
their “heads on straight,” I refer to the recent legal scholarship that refers to how people make choices 
(whether in the real world or in the laboratory).  This recent scholarship is a reaction, in part, to 
friendly critics of law and economics who argued that it was important to enrich the “rational actor” 
model with data about how real people make choices.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and 
Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
23 (1989) (critiquing traditional law and economists for assuming that individuals would be rational 
actors).  Bringing human frailty to rational actors was a difficult process.  See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & 
Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 789 (2000) 
(describing early difficulty in persuading legal academics to take juror research seriously).  Moreover, 
scholars are still engaged in a vigorous debate about the meaning of recent experimental studies.  See 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A 
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1501–03 (1998) (describing “far from resolved” debate 
about rationality). 
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“behavioralism,” argue2 that people do a bad job at making decisions 
based on “good reasons and with as much information as possible.”3  
Others argue this new behavioralism research is misguided:  its empirical 
studies are flawed,4 and the project lacks a theoretical core.5 
This debate between practitioners of behavioralism and their critics 
has waged hotly but would be of little interest outside the academy if 
some behavioralists had not begun to employ their empirical research in 
recommending surprisingly paternalistic social policies.  While the origi-
nal behavioralists simply called for enriching the theoretical model of the 
rational actor in law and economics, their latter day incarnations have 
tied behavioral research to the conclusion that people are irrational.  
Liberal scholars like Cass Sunstein6 use behavioralism to argue that poli-
 
Many use this “rationality debate” as a starting off point for discussion of law and economic themes.  
See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 2 (2002) (“[B]ehavioral law and economics has fostered renewed academic skepticism about 
central tenets of law and economics that depend on strong rationality assumptions.”); Daniel A. Far-
ber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001) (describing rationality debate); 
David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 356–59 (2002) (discussing how legal economists made practical decisions before 
behavioralism changed their assumptions).  Of the many articles describing the rationality debate, 
none does so more elegantly than Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: 
A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998). 
 2. The principal trilogy of behavioralism articles is by Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar.  See Jon 
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market 
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, A Response to 
Market Manipulation]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).  Hanson and Kysar’s focus is on the 
experimental data and its implications for policy.  Others have focused on how the experimental data 
affects the “rational choice” model in law and economics.  See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (arguing that “bounded rationality,” 
“bounded willpower,” and “bounded self-interest” provide models for consistent departure from a 
pure expected utility model of human behavior); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051 (2000) (arguing that existing versions of rationality theory offer predictions about behavior that 
are often false).  For a more general review of behavioralism literature, see Langevoort, supra note 1; 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Sup-
porters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future Behavioral Economic 
Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1777–81 (1998). 
 3. MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS OR HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229 
(2d ed. 1992), quoted in Schroeder, supra note 1, at 152.  The quote refers to economists’ traditional 
definition of rationality. 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a 
Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioral-
ism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002); see also GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US 
SMART (Stephen Stich ed., 1999) (arguing that use of simple and accurate heuristics is rational). 
 5. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1551 (1998) (arguing that behavioralists lack a theoretical model).  But see Rachlinski, supra 
note 2, at 748–53 (arguing behavioralist observations, though marked by a “laundry-list” syndrome, 
have theoretical coherence). 
 6. See Nancy Benac, Analysis: War Raises Constitutional Questions, COLUMBIAN, June 23, 2002, 
at A8 (“Cass Sunstein, a liberal University of Chicago law professor . . . .”); Robert G. Kaiser & Tho-
mas B. Edsall, The Two Theodore Olsons; Although Conservatives Love Him, Some Doubt Solicitor 
HOFFMAN.DOC 8/20/2003  10:31 AM 
No. 2] HOW RELEVANT IS JURY RATIONALITY? 509 
cies of paternalism—or taking power away from irrational citizens and 
giving it to bureaucrats—are now worth renewed consideration.7  Against 
this emerging paternalist tide, a few stalwart defenders of democratic 
choice, like Judge Richard Posner, raise cries of “totalitarian[ism].”8  The 
relationship between behavioralism, irrationality, and paternalism has 
just begun to receive scholarly attention.9 
The debate about behavioralism’s foundations and empirical con-
tent—which purportedly grapples with deep questions about how people 
make decisions, and the different kinds of ways people can be rational—
is a red herring.10  The new paternalist proposals, although they often 
mention behavioralist data, are not logically related to the cognitive bi-
ases, heuristics, and tics that together define the new consensus about 
human irrationality.  Instead, the new paternalism is motivated by a se-
ries of experiments establishing that individuals reject making legal deci-
 
General Nominee’s Candor, WASH. POST, May 17, 2001, at A1 (“Cass Sunstein, a liberal law professor 
at the University of Chicago . . . .”); Walter Shapiro, Hype and Glory, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2001, at 
A4 (“Cass Sunstein, a leading liberal legal theorist at the University of Chicago . . . .”). 
 7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1997) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis] (“Recent revisions in understanding human behavior 
greatly unsettle certain arguments against paternalism in law. . . . [T]hey support a form of 
anti-antipaternalism.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Sunstein, The Laws of Fear] (reviewing THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 1, and arguing that 
populist arguments fail in the face of data about human irrationality); cf. Arlen et al., supra note 1; 
Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1743–44 
(1998) (arguing that even though academics have proposed interventionism, it would be unwise); Eyal 
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998) (employing behavioralism data to 
conclude that paternalism creates efficiency).  Some of Sunstein’s proposals, like eliminating the jury 
system in favor of a workers-compensation-like regime, are not novel.  See Stephen D. Sugarman, Do-
ing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985) (arguing that costs of tort law exceed its benefits 
and the system should be replaced by regulatory and insurance regimes).  This earlier work was not 
based on data about irrationality, although jury irrationality was mentioned in passing as an anecdotal 
reason to distrust the tort system.  Id. at 612.  In this essay, when I refer to the “paternalists” or the 
“new paternalists,” I mean those scholars who, relying on new empirical and laboratory results about 
human behavior, argue for removing power from ordinary people and vesting it in bureaucrats.  I have 
excluded from my discussion the work of scholars who, concluding that individuals suffer from cogni-
tive biases rendering them susceptible to manipulation, call for expansion of the liability of corpora-
tions.  See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, A Response to Market Manipulation, supra note 2 (arguing that be-
havioralism research supports enterprise liability). 
 8. Posner, supra note 5, at 1575. 
 9. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1023, 1027 (2000) (explaining that behavioral economics is likely to increase paternalistic pro-
posals because it offers a new kind of argument technique); Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1744–45 (dis-
cussing the likelihood that behavioralism will lead to paternalistic policy proposals and arguing that 
this would be unjustified); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1929 (“Reconceiving people as cognitive misers 
rather than economic misers leads to a very different conception of how people should be treated un-
der the law, with cognitive misers generally due less responsibility and autonomy and in need of 
greater oversight, control, and assistance.”).  For an earlier, nonlegal, view of the relationship between 
behavioral economics and democratic decision making, see Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust and De-
mocracy, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 1, at 316, 324–26 (arguing that the “French model” 
of paternalism is likely to be unacceptable in the United States). 
 10. In an earlier article, a coauthor and I noted the connection between behavioralism research 
and paternalism.  See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 337–39.  That article’s critique of paternal-
ism was internal to existing law and economic theoretical models.  In this essay, by contrast, I offer an 
external critique of paternalism. 
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sions through explicit weighing of monetary costs against benefits.  Al-
though these preferences may be entirely rational and consistent, they fly 
in the face of the utilitarian morality which is at the heart of the new pa-
ternalists’ conception of our legal system. 
By failing to make an explicit connection between their policies and 
the public’s dislike of cost-benefit decision making, the new paternalists 
have scored impressive rhetorical victories over their adversaries.  One 
such rhetorical victory has been their fight against the American jury sys-
tem,11 waged in symposiums, books, and articles over the last few years.12  
Defenders of the jury have unwisely allowed themselves to join the hy-
per-complex, hyper-technical debate about juror rationality.13  In this de-
bate, the jury’s defenders have been overwhelmed by a rush of studies 
demonstrating that jurors, like the rest of society, are imprecise decision 
makers.14 
In Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide,15 the paternalists present 
their strongest case for terminating the civil jury system, and demonstrate 
the rhetorical attack I have just described.  The book collects research 
about decision making by jurors and individuals,16 and after evaluating 
 
 11. Cf. Robert A. Klinck, The Punitive Damages Debate, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 472 (2001) 
(describing the view that reform of juries is necessary as “more prominent”); Lisa Litwiller, Has the 
Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-
Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 468 (2002) (arguing that a recent Supreme 
Court case changing review of damage awards rested, in part, on arguments of jury irrationality). 
 12. For a thorough literature review, see Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 1, at 788–90; see also 
Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2001) (arguing that mod-
ern trends make civil jury increasingly obsolete); Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Remov-
ing the People from the Legal Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242, 251–56 (1997) (defending ju-
ries from psychologically based attacks). 
 13. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages: An Empirical 
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002) (defending juries with empirical studies); Lempert, supra note 
4 (attacking jury critics’ methodology); Richard Lempert, Why Do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections 
on the Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454–55 (1998) (arguing the same); Robert C. 
MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000) (arguing the same). 
 14. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 15. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP VISCUSI, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL.].  Daniel Kahneman, 
although a coauthor of some of the original articles which form the book, did not participate in its con-
struction and is not a listed author.  Id. at ix.  The authors note that their research has “different em-
phasis and different concerns,” but their differences are “dwarfed by the commonalities.”  Id.  There-
fore, I refer to them throughout as “the authors” or “they,” although I recognize that some authors 
may not subscribe to some of the language expressed by others. 
 16. The authors rely on several previously published articles.  Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & 
John W. Payne, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive 
Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1998); Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Ju-
ror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage 
Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror 
Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1999); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Per-
formance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); David A. Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating 
About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000) [hereinafter Schkade et al., Delib-
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this data—which “no one could have predicted”17—concludes with a 
sweeping indictment of jury rationality.  Because jurors’ tasks “ex-
ceed[ed] their individual and social capacities,”18 their good intentions 
failed to prevent them from producing “unreliable, erratic, and unpre-
dictable” results.19  In short:  the jury system is irrational. 
The authors recommend that we dispense with the jury system in 
civil cases20 and replace it with a “schedule of fines and penalties, over-
seen by administrative officials.”21  This system, although vulnerable to 
populist attacks,22 would perform better than a system founded on erratic 
citizen participation.23  The authors leave the practical question of de-
signing such an “ideal system” of bureaucracy to further scholarship,24 
but suggest that it could look like an expanded version of worker’s com-
pensation.25 
Through a close reading of Punitive Damages, I hope to refute its 
authors’ claim that jury irrationality or unpredictability requires their 
proposal to substitute a new bureaucracy for the 225-year-old American 
civil jury system.  Part I demonstrates that:  (1) the authors’ data is vul-
nerable to powerful internal critiques; and (2) the data, because it con-
cludes nothing about individuals that has not been known anecdotally for 
hundreds of years, does not support the reforms the authors propose.  
Because the authors’ claims are representative of those of the larger 
group of paternalists whose arguments have recently been so prominent, 
it is disturbing that, to date, few of the jury’s defenders have addressed 
the disjunct between the paternalists’ data and their reforms. 
In part II, I argue that citizens’ rejection of cost-benefit-based deci-
sion making in court cases is related, both logically and politically, to the 
new paternalists’ proposals.  This evidence—forming about half of Puni-
tive Damages substantive chapters—gives rise to a tension between what 
legal economists want the legal system to create (efficiency and deter-
 
erating About Dollars]; Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David A. Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) [hereinafter 
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages]; Cass R. Sunstein, David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahne-
man, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., 
Deterrence]; W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000); 
W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26 (1999); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001); W. Kip Vis-
cusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001) [hereinafter Vis-
cusi, Punitive Damages Mathematics].  
 17. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 236. 
 18. Id. at 241. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Nowhere in the book do the authors limit their claims to tort cases.  In theory, their results 
apply equally to actions sounding in contract, property, and constitutional law.  I have chosen not to 
address the constitutional issues raised by these proposals.  Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 21. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 252. 
 22. See id. at 255. 
 23. See id. at 257. 
 24. Id. at 258. 
 25. See id. at 253–55. 
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rence) and what individual citizens want (fairness and justice).  Although 
this tension is not new, it has only recently been quantified and given sta-
tistical heft.  These new experiments provide intriguing evidence that 
minorities and women reject utilitarian cost-benefit balancing at higher 
rates than white men. 
Part III discusses how conflating data about individual irrationality 
and individual rejection of cost-benefit decision making allows the new 
paternalists, including the authors, to avoid answering hard questions 
about the latter evidence.  I argue that if defenders of the jury system 
could move beyond rationality, the frame through which we debate jury 
capability would change.  Rather than asking if juries are irrational, we 
would be asking more important questions:  (1) what moral goals are 
served by cost-benefit decision making?;26 (2) why is cost-benefit decision 
making rejected by women and minorities at higher rates?;27 and (3) is it 
appropriate to disempower citizens because they reject cost-benefit 
analysis?28 
I. DO ORDINARY PEOPLE HAVE THEIR HEADS SCREWED ON 
STRAIGHT? 
Cass Sunstein’s 1997 article, Behavioral Analysis of Law, provided 
one of the first explicit links between behavioral research and paternal-
ism.29  Sunstein wrote, “there is reason to question whether respect for 
[irrational decisions] is a good way to promote utility or welfare.”30  In 
other words, if citizens cannot make rational choices, perhaps it is a bad 
idea to give them what they want.  Sunstein then defended “anti-
antipaternalism:”31  paternalism makes sense if people cannot be edu-
cated or instructed to do the right thing.32  Sunstein urged scholars to “go 
to work” on these questions.33 
Some scholars have since argued that behavioralism research sug-
gests that people are irrational,34 while others disagree.35  A frustrated 
 
 26. See, e.g., Steven Garber, Comment, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-
Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without a Solution, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2000) (discussing the 
failure of economists to make explicit assumption that efficiency should guide jury decision making); 
see also Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 341–45, 354–56 (discussing the failure of economists to 
provide explicit moral and practical justifications for their policy proposals). 
 27. See generally Laura Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of 
the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 353–56 (1995) (arguing against attempts to impose rationality, 
traditionally defined by white men, on juries). 
 28. See Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 414–15 (suggesting that paternalistic proposals will 
be impractical, even if they are otherwise moral). 
 29. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 7, at 1178. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 1193–94. 
 33. See id. at 1195. 
 34. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: 
The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 735 (2000) (stating that people are subject 
to “general irrationality in processing information”); W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-
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few throw up their hands, arguing that there is no way to distinguish ra-
tional from irrational behavior—both words essentially state conclusions 
based on the speaker’s perspective of how people should act.36  Without 
becoming overly technical, one can fairly state that “rationality” once 
had a perfectly clear meaning, and now does not.  A simple illustration 
may be helpful. 
A person—I will call her Dori—used to be called rational if she (1) 
knew what she wanted; and (2) was capable of choosing, and did choose, 
the best way of getting it.37  Behavioralism research purports to establish 
several “cognitive biases” or “cognitive errors” preventing Dori from 
giving herself what she wants.38  From the perspective of the original 
definition of rational, such cognitive errors render Dori’s behavior irra-
tional.  But, some behavioralists have argued that we ought to stretch the 
original definition of rationality so that Dori, no matter how odd her be-
havior may look, may still be called rational.39 
 
Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (2002) (describ-
ing how social norms may lead people to fail to maximize their expected utility in irrational ways); cf. 
Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets 
Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1148–51 (2001) (describing how behavioralism research 
has challenged law and economists to refine idea of rationality so that behavior which looks “irra-
tional” may be considered rational).  Notably, Cass Sunstein sometimes disavows arguments that be-
havioralism research means that people are irrational, but sometimes treats behavioralism research as 
evidence of irrationality.  Compare Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 7, at 1175 (“[I]t does not 
follow that people’s behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive 
to social scientists.”), with Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regula-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 756 (1999) (“Counteracting the irrational attitudes and counterproductive 
policy demands caused by cognitive biases and distortions of public discourse, a [Risk Information 
Site] would help individuals form their risk preferences and judgments more rationally than is cur-
rently possible.”); compare id. at 689 (“There is nothing irrational about participating in an informa-
tional cascade.”), with Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 7, at 1131 (“Because dramatic events are 
an important determinant of individual risk judgments, a highly publicized incident might exacerbate 
unwarranted or irrational fears.”); compare Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fash-
ions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2001) (“Nor do I mean to suggest that those who are vulnerable to 
informational pressures are weak or irrational.”), with Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1086 (2000) (“Here the question is whether government can legiti-
mately spend extra resources to avert the harms associated with irrational public attitudes.”).  Sunstein 
is aware of the imprecision of the word “irrationality.”  See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1998) 
(Posner and others “write as if ‘irrationality’ and ‘irrational behavior’ are at the heart of behavioral 
economics and behavioral law and economics.  But our article intentionally avoided that word, on the 
ground that it is not useful and is likely to mislead.  We do far better to specify how human beings ac-
tually behave (and depart from the conventional theory) than to argue whether they are ‘irrational.’”). 
 35. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5. 
 36. See Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer Psycho-
logical Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81, 100–01 (2000). 
 37. Posner, supra note 5, at 1551.  Posner states: 
For example, a rational person who wants to keep warm will compare the alternative means 
known to him of keeping warm in terms of cost, comfort, and other dimensions of utility and dis-
utility, and will choose from this array the means that achieves warmth with the greatest margin 
of benefit over cost, broadly defined.  Rational choice need not be conscious choice.  Rats are at 
least as rational as human beings when rationality is defined as achieving one’s ends (survival and 
reproduction, in the case of rats) at least cost. 
 38. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2. 
 39. See Jolls et al., supra note 2. 
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These terms are confusing, and the authors do not define them.40  
However, the authors do charge individuals with deviations from the 
“Dori wants-Dori gets” definition of rationality I have given above.41  
They argue that jurors do a bad job of making predictable decisions.42  I 
summarize these experimental results in subpart A, below.  I then con-
tinue, in subpart B, to offer an “internal critique” of this behavioralism 
evidence; in accord with several recent authors, I argue that the authors 
rely on flawed methodology.  In subpart C, I offer a more “external” cri-
tique.  I discuss the kind of legal system the authors envision, and how 
their paternalist proposals relate to that system.  I conclude that what-
ever one’s perspective on the meaning of the word rational and whatever 
one’s belief about the methodological and empirical bases of behavioral-
ism, those issues are almost irrelevant to the paternalistic solutions the 
authors propose. 
A. Punitive Damages: Experimental Results 
In Punitive Damages, the authors present ten chapters of experi-
mental data about individuals’ decision making as legal actors.  In seven 
of these chapters, the authors present evidence that individuals act irra-
tionally as prospective or mock jurors.43  The authors conclude that  “sys-
tematic, shared biases”44 render juror judgments that are “not rational or 
fair.”45  Jurors pick punitive damage awards through “erratic and unpre-
dictable cognitive processes.”46 
In evaluating the authors’ experimental results, I derive the follow-
ing rules describing how the authors believe the system should work:  (1) 
similar cases should have similar awards; (2) damages should be awarded 
based on what the parties knew at the time of the wrongdoing; and (3) 
the amount of punitive damages should be proportional to the amount of 
compensatory damages.47 
 
 40. The authors at one point argue that cognitive biases are not necessarily evidence of “irra-
tionality.”  SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 242 (arguing that jurors’ problems do not arise because 
they are “irrational, inattentive, or stupid”). 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 239. 
 42. See id. at 241. 
 43. Three additional chapters, which I discuss later, relate to people’s reactions to cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 44. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 239. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 240. 
 47. See id. at 25–26 (summarizing the experimental results). 
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1. Unpredictability of Awards 
The authors tested unpredictability by reporting how subjects re-
acted to mock tort cases.  Before examining the data, it may be useful to 
give a sense of the kinds of stories mock juries heard.48 
In one story, Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested non-
prescription medicine because she had been able to open a supposedly 
childproof cap.49  The company willfully ignored federal regulations that 
might have prevented the accident.50  The government warned the com-
pany of its failure, but an internal memo stated, “this stupid, unnecessary 
federal regulation is a waste of our money.”51  Noting the mildness of the 
government’s civil fine system, the company affirmatively decided to 
flout the law. 
The trial jury awarded compensatory damages of $200,000, and the 
remaining question was whether, and how much, to award in punitive 
damages.52  The child’s attorney, arguing for punitive damages, suggested 
that the company’s disregard for the child’s safety was “abhorrent and 
represented exactly the kind of reckless corporate greed deserving of a 
high award of punitive damages.”53  The company’s attorney argued that 
it was “not at all clear that the cap was actually in violation of the regula-
tion at all,” because the government’s warning about the cap was not in 
writing.54 
The authors concluded that citizens uniformly agree that this com-
pany deserves some punishment—we agree with each other around 90% 
of the time about the nature of the harm that has occurred.55  But, either 
as individuals or as collections of citizens discussing this issue, we are un-
able to award consistent verdicts in the same cases.56  Individuals’ inabil-
ity to find agreement on the amount of punishment resulted in “severe 
unpredictability and highly erratic outcomes.”57  Deliberation increased 
unpredictability:  after talking, awards became either much higher or 
much lower.58  The authors conclude from this data set that “[i]t is obvi-
ous that the judgment any particular dollar jury is likely to be a poor es-
timate of overall community sentiment.”59 
 
 48. This original data was not available in the book itself, but can be found in one of the articles 
forming its constituent parts.  See Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars, supra note 16, at 1174. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1150. 
 56. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 36–37. 
 57. Id. at 37. 
 58. Id. at 43; Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars, supra note 16, at 1172. 
 59. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 40–41. 
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2. Hindsight Bias 
Just as the amount of a punitive damage award was hard to predict, 
the authors concluded that the decision to award punitive damages was 
riddled with cognitive errors.60  One problem resulted from individuals’ 
irrational “heuristics” or shortcut ways of thinking about problems.61  A 
classic heuristic is “hindsight bias”:  jurors are unable to judge conduct in 
light of what the tortfeasor knew at the time that she made the relevant 
decision because jurors are affected by what they knew of what eventu-
ally occurred.62 
In the book, for example, some jurors were presented with a story 
about a potential railroad accident, and asked if, as a group of mock ju-
rors or as citizens evaluating a Regulatory Order, a company should take 
an action that would prevent future accidents.63  Others were presented 
with the same situation after the accident happened, and asked questions 
about the necessity of punitive damages.64  The experimenters reported 
that while only thirty-three percent of “foresight” condition respondents 
would force the repair, in hindsight, sixty-seven percent judged the rail-
road’s actions as reckless enough to engender a punitive award.65 
The authors doubt that deliberation would eliminate this hindsight 
bias because the problem is an “almost inevitable” result of allowing citi-
zens to make decisions.66  They believe that jurors are simply unable to 
rid themselves of the feeling of “I knew it all along.”67  Given two possi-
ble events, one occurring and one not, it is all too natural to assume that 
the thing that did happen was always more probable.68 
3. Proportionality 
Finally, the authors demonstrate how individuals fail to make puni-
tive damages proportional to compensatory damages.  Damages are dis-
torted from this ideal by party citizenship (local plaintiffs are pre-
ferred);69 party wealth (rich defendants are punished);70 party dollar 
demand (plaintiffs’ monetary demand of jury affected the verdict);71 and 
 
 60. Id. at 77. 
 61. Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 360–61. 
 62. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 96–97. 
 63. Id. at 100–01. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 103. 
 66. Id. at 108. 
 67. Id. at 107. 
 68. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclu-
sions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1280–85 (1999) (describing evidence of bias). 
 69. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 62–76. 
 70. See id. at 40. 
 71. See id. at 62–76. 
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party’s use of economic rationales to make a decision (use of cost-benefit 
analysis hurts defendants).72 
Overall, many scholars appear to agree with the authors that these 
cognitive biases render the task of being a juror overly complex.73  Juries 
have “good intentions and high levels of motivation,” but nevertheless 
are liable to give punitive awards that are “unreliable, erratic and unpre-
dictable.”74  They face “extremely serious problems in producing sensible 
and coherent outcomes.”75 
B. Internal Critique of Irrationality Data 
The data about rationality comes almost exclusively from a series of 
laboratory experiments testing people’s reactions to stimuli.  Critics of 
behavioralism’s empirical findings argue that isolating decision making in 
this way is an especially poor way to test human rationality.  In laborato-
ries, subjects lack context from which to make decisions—they are given 
no feedback or opportunity to learn from their mistakes.76  Critics also 
charge behavioralists with bias:  experiments, rather than being neutral 
about their results, seem designed to elicit nonrational responses.77  
Third, scholars argue that behavioralists have put cues into their experi-
ments that lead subjects astray.78  Fourth, there is little confirmation that 
laboratory conclusions about irrationality are reflected in real-world ju-
ror verdicts.79  Fifth, scholars, by focusing on narrow decision tasks, may 
discount longer range evolutionary advantages to supposedly irrational 
decisions.80  Finally, critics of the behavioralism studies argue that what-
ever the evidence of irrationality, the proposed reforms will do little to 
ameliorate the problem.81 
Punitive Damages, like much of the new behavioralist data, suffers 
from these methodological and structural problems.  Because these is-
sues have been extensively discussed elsewhere, I will not detail them 
here.  But, one example may be helpful:  the Glover case provides an ex-
 
 72. See id. at 112–31. 
 73. See id. at 242. 
 74. Id. at 241. 
 75. Id. at 243. 
 76. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1977–79; see also Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on 
General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
712, 718 (2000) (“Unlike judges, jurors are systematically denied any information about decisions by 
other juries in prior cases, depriving them of information that could help them treat like cases alike.”). 
 77. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1972–77. 
 78. Lempert, supra note 4, at 880–81; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1979–84. 
 79. See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., supra note 13, at 744–46 (arguing that juries typically relate puni-
tive damages awards to compensatory damages). 
 80. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 34 (articulating the long-term rationality theory); Kelman, supra 
note 1, at 1580–86 (describing debate between the rationalists and the irrationalists); Posner, supra 
note 5, at 1561–64 (describing evolutionary theory and its relationship to rationality assumptions). 
 81. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 159–90 (2002). 
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cellent case study in the authors’ methodological errors.82  There, subjects 
were told that compensatory damages had already been awarded.  Le-
gally, the only possible way this could have been so was that a previous 
fact finder had found that the defendant failed to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances.  Yet, in the closing, the defendant’s attorney is 
made to say, “it was not at all clear that the cap was actually in violation 
of the regulation at all.”83  A reasonable juror, hearing both the instruc-
tion (negligence established) and the corporate defendant’s intransigent 
response, might believe that a message beyond deterrence was neces-
sary.84  Is it surprising that ninety percent of respondents voted to award 
punitive damages?85 
These criticisms of behavioralism research in general, and the au-
thors’ own previously published studies in particular, are powerful.  It is 
surprising, as Punitive Damages postdates this criticism, that the authors 
do not directly confront these issues.  The general interest reader will 
find only one hint that the data is controversial.86 
C. An External Critique of the Connection Between Irrationality and 
Paternalism 
I predict that behavioralism will soon undergo a crisis of confidence 
brought on by attacks on its methodological foundations.  But, however 
valuable these criticisms may be, they distract attention away from what 
is really at issue.  In this subpart, I examine the logic of the connection 
between behavioralism (with its conclusion that people behave erratic-
ally in setting damage awards) and the paternalistic solutions the authors 
 
 82. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 83. Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars, supra note 16, at 1174. 
 84. Other possible methodological problems existed.  The authors gave individuals a list of dis-
eases and asked how likely they were to be affected by them.  Not surprisingly, individuals overesti-
mated the effect of unlikely, but widely reported, illnesses like Botulism and underestimated the ef-
fects of common killers like strokes.  The authors did not explore a crucial question:  does it make 
sense for individuals to know about the different risks they have of death from various, apparently 
randomly selected, causes of death?  For the nonmorbid, or the nonactuaries, it does not.  The only 
possible result of the experiment is a mixture of informed and outright guesses.  Diseases that have 
lower incidences are more likely to be overidentified, as a matter of simple statistics.  SUNSTEIN ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 181–84. 
Additionally, while the authors report that judges perform significantly better than juries and (pre-
sumably) award punitive damages less frequently, real world tests of verdicts confirm that laboratory 
results are not easily transferable to the real world.  For example, the recently published study by 
Eisenberg et al., studied forty-five large trial courts conducting 9,000 trials.  This review “yield[ed] no 
evidence that judges and juries differ significantly in their rates of awarding punitive damages, or in 
the relation between the size of punitive and compensatory damages.”  Eisenberg et al., supra note 13, 
at 746.  The authors, who at one point assert “there is not a single instance in which our results dis-
agree with findings from other experiments,” SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 20, later acknowledge 
this study but dismiss it, arguing that “[e]ven if judges and juries do produce similar decisions, our ba-
sic claims here would not be much affected” because their proposed ideal solution would transfer 
power from judges as well.  Id. at 252. 
 85. Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars, supra note 16, at 1150. 
 86. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 249–52 (discussing Eisenberg study); infra note 108. 
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propose.  I argue that even if behavioralism research were methodologi-
cally unassailable, it could not support the authors’ proposed solution:  
removing all power from civil juries and transferring it to bureaucrats 
applying a worker’s compensation-like grid.87 
The first page of Punitive Damages states, without citation, that we 
have “experienced a dramatic increase in the incidence and magnitude of 
punitive damages” awards.88  While this increase alone may not be a 
problem (the authors acknowledge that punitive damage awards remain 
rare), the decision to award damages, and the magnitude of awards, are 
inconsistent.  This “substantial variability in punitive damages verdicts”89 
is inconsistent with our commitment to the “[R]ule of [L]aw.”90  If indi-
viduals cannot award damages with “reason and consistency,” then the 
system itself is flawed.91 
The authors—establishing that their test subjects did not always 
award punitive verdicts consistently or based on legally acceptable fac-
tors—conclude the Rule of Law is being undermined from within.  A 
principal value of the system is that awards should be predictable.92  
When awards are unpredictable, punitive damages do not serve the sys-
temic goal of the jury system that juries reflect community sentiment.93  
Judges, who are less prone to the jury’s problems, or bureaucrats, who 
might be even better at achieving consistency, should be given power.94 
In thinking about what the authors must mean by the phrase “Rule 
of Law,” I identify two themes:  (1) the Rule of Law requires similar facts 
to receive similar treatment by courts;95 and (2) the Rule of Law requires 
that parties be able to determine, at the time when they are acting, the 
ultimate legal cost of that action with some certainty.96 
The authors’ concern about disparate treatment of similar tortfea-
sors is addressed most fully by their “moderate” proposal to require 
judges to compare punitive damage awards to similar ones in that district 
when evaluating their appropriateness.97  However, as the authors note, 
the Supreme Court has rejected this proposal as a constitutional re-
quirement.98  Without defending its merits as a “matter of constitutional 
law,”99 the authors move on to more radical suggestions, and seemingly 
abandon this “moderate” idea. 
 
 87. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 252. 
 88. Id. at 1. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 2. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. See id. at 251. 
 93. See id. at 249. 
 94. See id. at 248–49. 
 95. See id. at 3–5. 
 96. See id. at 246. 
 97. See id. at 251. 
 98. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). 
 99. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 251. 
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And what of the need for perfect foresight?  The authors do not 
provide any support for their idea that the Rule of Law requires that le-
gal actors know with precision the legal consequences of their actions.  
Of course, some knowledge about legal consequences is necessary.100  
However, in the context of civil cases, the standard for actors is often not 
self-knowledge, but objective knowledge:  what will a jury believe was a 
reasonable action in light of a legal duty.  The authors imagine that we 
could somehow create a table, with every possible bad act placed in con-
text, paired with every possible resultant injury, every risk of detection, 
and come out with every possible damage award, all before the actions 
analyzed have occurred. 
To see how this system might work, imagine a scenario based on the 
famous torts case of Vosberg v. Putney.101  Were you hit in the kneecap 
by a child in the schoolroom?  Damages are $500.00, unless the teacher 
watches her charges one-sixth of the time, in which case punitive dam-
ages are (harm = $500) * 1/(probability of detection = 1/6) = $3,000.00.  
But it is difficult to imagine room on this table for the egg-shell plaintiff 
rule, which in Vosberg, allowed recovery for harm the defendant could 
not have predicted.102  Providing recovery for the egg-shell plaintiff cre-
ates unpredictability. 
In this pursuit of clear outcomes, and of tables, the authors pay 
homage to Justice Scalia’s “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,”103 with a 
twist:  the authors’ Rule of Law is a Law Without Litigants.  For if the li-
ability charts the authors propose were to exist, who would ever commit 
a tort?104 
I want to take a step back from the authors’ arguments about the 
Rule of Law for a moment to regain a sense of perspective.  Lest we 
worry that our system has always been secretly unstable, we should ask 
how often the authors’ proposed unpredictability is likely to affect civil 
verdicts.  One recent study found that during fiscal year 1991–1992, in 
state courts of general jurisdiction in forty-five of the seventy-five most 
populous counties in the nation, punitive damages were awarded in 
roughly 6% of tort cases in which the plaintiff won (177 out of 2,849 
cases).105  According to the authors, this study provides misleading con-
 
 100. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) (“Second, the Rule of Law should allow people to plan their affairs with 
reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal consequences of various actions.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 101. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
 102. Id. at 404. 
 103. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–80 (1989). 
 104. If litigants knew all costs and benefits, they would only act when benefits exceeded costs.  By 
definition, according to the authors, those cost-justified actions would be nonnegligent.  Is it fair to 
conclude that perfect foreknowledge of costs would preclude their imposition? 
 105. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 
631–34 (1997). 
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clusions about the unpredictability of jury awards,106 but the authors do 
not contest the rarity of punitive damages.  Does our system really sub-
vert the Rule of Law when it denies 94% of prevailing plaintiffs punitive 
damages, and provides only a tiny fraction the billion dollar verdicts that 
the authors point to, and of that tiny fraction, reverses or reduces most 
on appeal? 
The authors’ claims are a variant of Chicken Little’s.107  Without 
much real world evidence of how our legal system fails to provide citi-
zens guidance when making decisions about the probable legal costs of 
their actions, the authors recommend a drastic paternalistic solution.  
But, our economy remains, recent experiences to the contrary, highly 
successful; our public institutions relatively free of graft; our infant mor-
tality levels low.  By any fair standard, there is little evidence that jury ir-
rationality is destroying the fabric of the polity.  The authors critique is 
entirely constructed through laboratory results about hypothetical be-
havior.  Given the radical nature of their proposals, they have failed to 
meet their burden of showing a connection between erratic or irrational 
awards and the emergent necessity of paternalism. 
A central problem is that there is no rigorous way to distinguish the 
jurors of today with those sitting in cases from the very beginning of the 
Republic.  Juror irrationality is not news.  Anecdotal historical evidence 
shows that people have always known that jurors are inconsistently pre-
cise decision makers.  A belief that juries were irrational may have had 
its roots in the mid-nineteenth century, a product of expanding the for-
merly all-male, all-white venire.108  In 1905 William Howard Taft decried 
 
 106. The authors’ argument against Eisenberg’s study has several parts.  First, they argue that 
Eisenberg’s cases are not representative of the “volatile areas” of products liability, medical malprac-
tice and toxic substance liability, which are the subject of the book.  SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 
246.  This objection is hard to square with the authors’ proposals:  the book’s paternalistic conclusions 
do not limit their applicability to “volatile” subject matters.  Even if they did, there will be statistical 
extremes in any data set:  existing tools of appellate review are well designed to reduce excessive ver-
dicts.  Second, the authors argue that the decision whether or not to award punitive damages is part of 
the unpredictability they have observed.  However, their own research describes a wide agreement 
among experimental subjects about the need for punitive awards.  Third, the authors note Eisenberg 
et al.’s conclusion that punitive damages are tied to compensatory damages, but argue that because 
defendants do not know compensatory verdicts up front, they have little guidance on punitive awards.  
They believe “undoubtably” that any estimate of compensatory verdicts would lead to substantial er-
ror.  Even if one could “know” the compensatory award, the Eisenberg study explained that punitive 
damages were only partly related to compensatory levels.  The authors conclude that the legal system 
is not “complying with the aspirations of the rule of law.”  Id. at 247.  That is, the authors argue that 
the Rule of Law requires perfect foreknowledge of the legal costs of action.  This idealistic vision of 
the Rule of Law bears no real recognition to what most people think it stands for.  See Fallon, supra 
note 100, at 8–9 (describing different “elements” making up the “Rule of Law”). 
 107. See generally SALLY HOBSON, CHICKEN LITTLE (1994). 
 108. Dooley, supra note 27, at 353–56 (collecting literature and arguing that criticisms of juries 
arose contemporaneously with the end of the all-white, all-male jury); Douglas G. Smith, The Histori-
cal and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 445 (1996) (describing ero-
sion of support for jurors as rational fact finder beginning in the nineteenth century).  Dooley quotes 
the fictional bar tender Mr. Dooley (who, she assures, is no relation of hers), saying of a jury in 1898:  
“Whin th’ case is all over, the jury’ll pitch th’ testimony out iv th’ window, an’ consider three ques-
tions:  ‘Did Lootgert look as though he’d kill his wife?  Did his wife look as though she ought to be 
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the contemporary tendency “to exalt the jury’s power beyond anything 
which is wise or prudent”;109 Judge Frank, shortly thereafter, said “[a] 
better instrument could scarcely be imagined for achieving uncertainty, 
capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of former decisions—utter 
unpredictability.”110 
This anecdotal history makes it difficult to understand what effect 
the new debate about rationality has on our understanding of the jury’s 
role as a guide of community sentiment.  To be sure, Punitive Damages 
attempts to quantify this irrationality.  But the laboratory results, even if 
“real,” tell us what we already know:  jury’s verdicts about punitive dam-
ages are not perfectly predictable.  They are affected by nonlegal factors, 
and they are manipulable by smart lawyers. 
The authors’ justification for paternalism reduces to the following 
argument:  (1) unpredictability, a product of irrationality, mars jury deci-
sion making about punitive damages; (2) unpredictability undermines the 
Rule of Law.  However, as I have shown, jury unpredictability has lim-
ited impact on the overwhelming majority of civil tort trials.  Of those 
limited trials where punitive damages are applied, the resulting unpre-
dictability is no different—or at least no different on any measure the au-
thors provide—from that present since the beginning of the Republic.  
The Rule of Law can only be impacted by this deeply rooted, though 
relatively insignificant, unpredictability, if one defines the Rule of Law to 
mean that legal costs should be perfectly foreseeable for any given ac-
tion. 
When the authors argue that jury inconsistency undermines the 
Rule of Law,111 they are implicitly describing their own political vision of 
what the legal system should look like, not what it is.112  The Rule of Law 
is traditionally identified as a positive account of the legal system, not a 
normative proposal for what the system should be.113  When the authors 
propose that we change our system to one of perfect foreseeability and 
award-tables, they are not articulating a defense of the Rule of Law; they 
are proposing a radical departure from the adversary, adjudicatory, dis-
pute resolution system that exists.  Where the Rule of Law implies that 
 
kilt?  Isn’t it time we wint to supper?’”  Id. at 330 n.21 (quoting FINLEY P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY IN 
PEACE AND WAR 141–45 (Boston, Small, Maynard & Co. 1898), quoted in JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES 
AND POLITICS ix (1992)). 
 109. William H. Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1905). 
 110. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172 (6th prtg. 1949); see also HARRY 
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8–9 (1966) (“[C]ritics complain that the jury will 
not follow the law, either because it does not understand it or because it does not like it, and that thus 
only a very uneven and unequal administration of justice can result from reliance on the jury . . . .”). 
 111. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 247. 
 112. Cf. Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR 
IDEOLOGY 1, 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (“[T]he phrase ‘the Rule of 
Law’ . . . may well have become just another of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace 
the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians.”), quoted in Fallon, supra note 100, at 2 n.8. 
 113. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1159 
(1997). 
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individuals will be governed by a system of laws, the authors propose 
that we be defined by a technocratic grid.  Looking only to evidence of 
human irrationality,  Punitive Damages fails to articulate why this radical 
model of the Rule of Law is moral, or even necessary. 
II. CITIZENS’ REACTIONS TO BALANCING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
While jury research on irrationality affects the foresight model on 
the margin, research on jury reaction to cost-benefit analysis directly un-
dercuts the model’s core.  If, as I will show, legal actors performing cost-
benefit analyses are penalized by juries, then the authors’ vision of the 
Rule of Law is endangered.  It is this research, and its probable relation 
to the new paternalist proposals, that I turn to next. 
The case of the exploding Ford Pinto, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor 
Co.,114 marks the first well-known instance of the law confronting the 
hard issue of citizen reaction to cost-benefit balancing.115  In that case, 
Ford chose to release a vehicle it knew had a design flaw because the cost 
of replacing the vehicle exceeded the benefits due to society, assuming 
that the benefit of a human life was $200,000.116  The jury punished Ford 
with a $125 million punitive award (later reduced on appeal to $3.5 mil-
lion).117  In the years since the Pinto case, several different scholars have 
attempted to decipher why Ford’s cost-benefit analysis was so unpleasant 
for juries.118 
Until very recently, however, the idea that jurors (and individuals in 
society more generally) found cost-benefit analysis distasteful was anec-
dotal, and limited to cases like the Pinto.119  There was little explicit data 
supporting the idea that a defendant’s use of cost-benefit analysis was a 
guaranteed ticket to a windfall verdict.  Indeed, Professor Gary Schwartz, 
 
 114. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). 
 115. See MacCoun, supra note 13, at 1831 n.2 (stating that the Ford Pinto case is an especially use-
ful illustrative tool); Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 
1035–39 (1991) (discussing public outrage about Ford’s cost-benefit tradeoff); W. Bradley Wendel, 
Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 149 (2000) (discussing the Ford Pinto case as 
archetype of juries rejecting cost-benefit analysis). 
 116. But see Schwartz, supra note 115, for another rendition of the story of how Ford lost its case.  
Schwartz argued, in part, that the jury was never really confronted with the cost-benefit test, as the 
trial judge rejected Ford’s proposed risk-benefit balancing jury instruction.  Id. at 1039–40. 
 117. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 390–91 (stating that a jury verdict of $125 million in punitive 
damages against an automobile manufacturer was reduced on appeal to $3.5 million). 
 118. See Dale Hattis & Sue Swedis, Uses of Biomarkers for Genetic Susceptibility and Exposure in 
the Regulatory Context, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 193–94 (2001) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis “ap-
pear[s] to reduce important policy decisions to purely technical analyses”); Hoffman & O’Shea, supra 
note 1, at 394–403 (discussing data about antiutilitarianism preferences, and suggesting that people 
have a positive taste for fairness and deontological, as opposed to utilitarian, legal analysis); Richard 
H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Plu-
ralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2150–51 (1990) (arguing that the Pinto jury’s 
punitive award “reflect[s] a more subtle set of judgments, not about whether trade-offs between safety 
and expense should ever be made, but about what it meant to make that particular trade-off in the 
particular context in which it had been made”); Schwartz, supra note 115, at 1038–47. 
 119. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 892. 
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who first devoted scholarly attention to the Pinto case, thought lawyers 
could convince jurors to accept efficiency-based analyses.120 
This anecdotal account began to change in the late 1990s, when the 
authors published empirical studies establishing that:  (1) individuals do 
not want economics applied to at least some legal choices; (2) in those 
circumstances, individuals will not apply cost-benefit thinking, no matter 
how strongly urged to do so; and (3) individuals will consider illegitimate 
courses of conduct that are arrived at through such economic decision 
making.  These studies, now collected in Punitive Damages,121 have had 
an enormous impact on how other scholars now view the institution of 
the American jury,122 as well as how corporations conduct their busi-
nesses.123 
Let me take a moment to briefly summarize the results of the stud-
ies the authors present in Punitive Damages.124  Subjects were asked 
about their reactions to an automobile design defect tort case.  In one 
scenario, where a corporation had not employed a cost-benefit analysis, 
individuals imposed an average of $2.91 million in punitive damages.  
But when companies employed cost-benefit decision making, they were 
penalized $4.59 million.125 
In another study, “ordinary people” as well as seemingly sympa-
thetic law students at the University of Chicago Law School were shown 
to reject attempts to apply economic models to punitive awards.126  They 
refused to award punitive damages according to the best known law and 
economics based instruction—awarding damages by multiplying the in-
verse of the probability of detection of the tortfeasor’s actions by the 
 
 120. See Schwartz, supra note 115, at 1037–38. 
 121. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15. 
 122. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety 
Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 167–68 (2001) (using new studies to construct a 
theory about how juries evaluate risk); Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malprac-
tice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 935 (2002) (suggesting that juror unwillingness to compute costs makes 
the jury inappropriate adjudicator of medical decisions); John M. Thomas, Design Litigation and Strict 
Liability III: The Problem of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 132, 
136 (2000) (“[I]n the context of specific cases involving specific injuries, not only are juries inclined to 
reject intuitively risk utility balancing, they are likely to punish manufacturers for engaging precisely in 
the risk utility analysis required by the law.”); W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to 
Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002).  Some scholars have reacted to the recent data 
by assuming that eventually juries can be made to accept cost-benefit balancing.  Stephen G. Gilles, 
On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 860 (2001) (arguing that juries will cease to “bridle” at cost-benefit analysis 
over time if this comes to be part of what “everybody knows” about negligence). 
 123. For an anecdotal discussion of how companies react to cost-benefit analyses, see Steven Gar-
ber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. 
REV. 237, 257 n.41.  For a discussion of how corporate criminal law ought to react to these new studies, 
see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally 
Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1273 n.218 (2000). 
 124. The following descriptions were adapted, in part, from Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 
395–404. 
 125. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 124. 
 126. Id. at 141. 
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amount of the compensatory award that would remedy the victim’s ac-
tual loss.127  Even varying the probability of detection by twenty-fold had 
no significant effect on the amount of the punitive award the subjects of-
fered.128  In a third experiment,129 individuals were to perform three cal-
culations before selecting a punitive damage award.  First, they were in-
structed to set the award that would be appropriate from a pure 
deterrence perspective.  That number, they were told, should equal the 
level of damages (the compensatory judgment) divided by the probabil-
ity of detection.  Second, they were told to think about what level of 
damages was necessary to punish corporate wrongdoing, but were in-
structed that such punishment may occur through the compensatory (and 
not the punitive) damage scheme.  Third, they were told to compute a 
weighted average of the first two numbers to find the optimal punitive 
award.130 
Only fifteen percent of respondents correctly applied the calculus.131  
Individuals were “simply reluctant or unable to carry out even the most 
basic mathematic calculations.”132  The amount of money that individuals 
believed necessary to punish corporations proved far more significant to 
determining the amount of their final damage award than did their view 
of the deterrence test. 
• Demographic differences proved to be significant determi-
nants of how likely individuals were to accept cost-benefit-
based instructions.133 
• Being a woman makes you 5% less likely to apply the deter-
rence-based mathematical calculus; 
• Being Latino makes you 8% less likely to apply the calculus; 
• Being African American makes you 11% less likely to apply 
the calculus; 
• Being college educated and having a graduate degree makes 
you 22 and 32% more likely, respectively, to apply cost-
benefit type decision making; 
• “Given . . . that these formulas required only simple 
multiplication, it would be difficult to make the case that 
these individuals were unable to carry out the basic 
arithmetic.  A more compelling explanation is that many 
respondents were simply unwilling to carry out these 
instructions.”134  The results may indicate a simple 
 
 127. Id. at 240–41. 
 128. Id. at 137, 139 tbl.8.2. 
 129. See id. at 142–70. 
 130. Id. at 144–45, 164–66. 
 131. Id. at 151 tbl.9.2, 152. 
 132. Id. at 164. 
 133. I found the detailed data discussed in the text, not in the book, but in one of the source pa-
pers.  See Viscusi, Punitive Damages Mathematics, supra note 16, at 339–40. 
 134. Id. at 338. 
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reluctance by women, for example, “to surrender their 
punitive damages judgment to a mathematical formula.”135 
I believe that this data is what has motivated the paternalism that 
increasingly marks the work of the authors, and other like-minded schol-
ars.  Unlike the data about erratic awards, arising from behavioralism re-
search about irrationality, the data about juror reactions to cost-benefit 
balancing is an explicit rejection of the paternalists’ idealized system.  
That system, as I have described it, is governed by the Rule of Law, 
where the Rule of Law means that actions have perfectly predictable le-
gal results, defined through explicit weighing of social costs and benefits.  
If people reject the concept of weighing costs and benefits, then they 
really are rejecting the Rule of Law, at least as defined by the authors.  
When individual jurors refuse to accept the central value of our legal sys-
tem, as currently understood by these law and economic scholars, pater-
nalistic reforms become necessary. 
III. HOW CONFLATING IRRATIONALITY AND DISLIKE OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS HELPS SCHOLARS ATTACK JURIES (AND CITIZEN 
DECISION MAKING) 
This part explores how conflating data about jury irrationality with 
data about jurors’ reactions to cost-benefit decision making offers pater-
nalists—whether they are conscious of it or not—important rhetorical 
advantages in their fight to change the way legal decisions are made in 
the United States.136  Unlike the previous two parts, I now aim my cri-
tique not at the authors but at their critics; I argue that the current focus 
of the antipaternalists is flawed. 
Early behavioralists believed that undermining the assumption that 
humans are rational actors would fundamentally change (and possibly 
undermine) law and economics.137  If law and economists were unable to 
predict how people react to law, the thinking went, normative work 
would be hard to defend.138  Many liberal and left-leaning scholars were 
in the forefront of the early rationality debate.139 
But, in recent years, the nature of the debate has changed.  Defend-
ers of individual choices—on the right and left—have attacked the ex-
perimental data and its theoretical grounding, on a variety of fronts.  As I 
 
 135. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 161. 
 136. Cass Sunstein has suggested that “availability entrepreneurs acting on behalf of corpora-
tions” may deliberately focus on individual cases of aberrant punitive damage awards as a means of 
encouraging public support for tort reform.  See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 34, at 687.  However, 
even if Punitive Damages is an example of availability entrepreneurship, it is not clear that the authors 
would distinguish evidence of juror “irrationality” from evidence about their reaction to cost-benefit 
analysis.  Some might argue that rejection of efficiency-based legal regimes is itself irrational. 
 137. See Hanson &  Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 634–35. 
 138. See Arlen, supra note 2, at 1767. 
 139. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 2. 
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have demonstrated above, this debate wages fiercely across legal acade-
mia, with no end in sight.140 
Simply by engaging in the debate about the meaning and empirical 
content of rationality and behavioralism, defenders of traditional com-
mon-law institutions like the jury find themselves on foreign ground.  
How are they to respond to laboratory studies about individuals’ cogni-
tive biases?  Most such scholars are ill equipped to start their own re-
search centers, and are not supported by the corporations that fund sev-
eral of the authors of Punitive Damages.141  The experiments detailed in 
Punitive Damages examine hundreds of test subjects:  does the average 
academic have access to such resources?  What corporation would spon-
sor laboratory studies defending the jury’s role in civil actions?142  By de-
bating citizen rationality viewed through the laboratory’s lens, defenders 
of democratic decision making immediately put themselves at a financial 
disadvantage. 
As significantly, it is unclear that defending juror “rationality” will 
be conclusive.  People do respond “irrationally” to some choices.  More-
over, competing studies are likely to confuse the issue, as scholars who 
wish to prove that individuals are rational, or irrational, have not reached 
a consensus about definitions.143 
Assume, however, that the behavioralism project were demon-
strated to lack a rigorous empirical core.  What then?  As part I shows, 
the debate about jury unpredictability is not logically related to the new 
paternalistic proposals which have so infected legal discourse.  Even if 
the jury’s defenders (or more broadly democratic decision making in 
general) were to establish that individuals could be trusted to run their 
own affairs, paternalists would not abandon their project.  They would be 
left with a definition of the Rule of Law—perfectly foreseeable legal 
costs based on explicit balancing of risks and harms—that alienates the 
great majority of the population, and a set of mechanisms with which to 
implement their ideal legal system that is equally distasteful. 
Because jury rationality is, in a way, irrelevant to the new paternal-
ists, it is fair to ask why they have not been called to task about this issue.  
 
 140. See supra note 1. 
 141. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 868–70 (discussing Exxon funding of Viscusi and Hastie’s 
scholarship). 
 142. See Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing 
Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129, 1147–49 (2002) (discussing 
Exxon funding of scholars and the business’s use of the experimental research in its attacks on punitive 
damage awards). 
 143. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1071–72; Posner, supra note 5, at 1558.  Hanson and Ky-
sar, recognizing this issue early on, applied the old phrase that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”  See 
Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 2, at 667.  But the atheoretical ob-
jection to evidence of actual human behavior has had a long history.  See Donald C. Langevoort, 
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 
913 n.214 (1992) (quoting economic scholarship from the 1980s that rejected behavioral data for lack 
of theoretical coherence). 
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Sunstein and others agree that behavioralism weakens the case for defer-
ence to individual choices, because behavioralism establishes that people 
do a bad job of evaluating risks, making decisions that are wise, and im-
plementing the decisions they have made to give themselves what they 
want.144  These conclusions are persuasive not through moral argument 
but by reference to empirical data.  Readers of the data are caught up in 
its assumptions, its precision, the graphs, the scientific rhetoric.  Profes-
sor McCloskey’s formulation of how data seduces legal scholars says it 
all:  “‘Look, I have a coefficient here statistically significantly different 
from zero:  promote me.’”145 
Unfortunately, debating whether people are or are not irrational, do 
or do not provide perfectly predictable punitive verdicts, respect or dis-
respect jury instructions, in the context of deciding how much power they 
ought to retain over legal institutions, is likely to prove an ineffective re-
joinder to the new paternalism. 
If the jury’s defenders can move beyond rationality, they can focus 
on the experiments about how juries, and members of the public, react to 
cost-benefit analysis.  They could examine why African Americans, Lati-
nos, women, the less-educated, and the poor all reject utilitarian models 
at higher rates than white men.  This astonishing fact has received almost 
no scrutiny,146 even though it confirms what many had long suspected 
about law and economics’ privilege of logic over real-world issues of 
gender and race.  A crucial component of the defense of juries should be 
that their critics must rely on a conception of the Rule of Law which has 
been statistically proven to be more appealing to white men than to mi-
norities and women. 
Similarly lost in the data has been any concern about the moral 
goals of the civil law.  The authors mention this concern in passing.  They 
say that the idea of deterrence providing the only justification for puni-
tive damages is “controversial, and we do not, as a group, intend to take 
a position on [it] here. . . .  We suggest only that many policy analysts be-
lieve that the task of the legal system is to [deter bad conduct] . . . .”147  
 
 144. See Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 7, at 1178. 
 145. Donald N. McCloskey, Essay, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752, 
765 (1988) 
 146. Cf. Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 402–03.  On the other hand, evidence that different 
kinds of people have different responses to risk itself has received scrutiny, both by psychologists and, 
increasingly, by legal academics.  See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying 
the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 1, at 390–412  (discussing the 
“inherently subjective” nature of risk assessment and demographic differences in risk perception); see 
also Staci Jeanne Krupp, Environmental Hazards: Assessing the Risk to Women, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L.J. 111, 125 (2000) (“[A]rguably, risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats may be acting on values 
and judgments about risk that women do not share, or may be neglecting concerns that are particular 
to women.”); Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 16, at 2100 (discussing gender 
differences in jury behavior); cf. Jan L. Hitchcock, Gender Differences in Risk Perception: Broadening 
the Contexts, 12 RISK 179 (2001) (arguing that risk assessments have drawn conclusions that overgen-
eralize from data about women’s responses to risk). 
 147. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 109. 
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Elsewhere they acknowledge that people “disagree about the purpose of 
punitive damage awards,” and, they concede, “many people, including 
many lawyers and judges, are unsure about economic analysis of the de-
terrence issue.”148  The authors provide no discussion of the intense 
moral and practical debates about applying efficiency to legal deci-
sions.149  There is no discussion of the effect a “retribution”-based theory 
of punitive damages would have on the authors’ judgment that all power 
should be transferred to the bureaucratic state.  Rather, the authors ac-
knowledge the controversy, and then move on as if it did not exist. 
Absent the distracting rationality debate, this disregard of moral is-
sues would have been impossible.  The authors would have been forced 
to confront the hard moral problems often hidden in law and economic 
analyses:  what goal is the system supposed to serve; and how should it 
best serve that goal?  Nowhere in the book do we learn that there is no 
agreement among scholars, and precious little explicit discussion, about 
these goals.150  The authors do not discuss the idea of wealth maximiza-
tion, a controversial concept at the heart of a deterrence-based theory of 
tort law.  Nowhere in the book do the authors give any real consideration 
of the possibility of educating the citizens to better comprehend the 
value of cost-benefit tradeoffs.151  Instead, the authors recommend that 
we all simply consider the practical (not the moral) implications of mov-
ing immense amounts of power to a bureaucratic state.  Paternalists ar-
gue that if bureaucratic control is practical, “whatever ordinary people 
think, the relevant administrators will seek to promote optimal deter-
rence.”152  Is this silence about moral issues defensible in light of the ir-
relevance of the data about unpredictability? 
Conflating data about irrationality with information about how 
much citizens dislike cost-benefit analysis thus provides paternalists with 
two main advantages:  (1) it engages opponents in a data heavy debate 
where defenders of the common-law jury are at a natural disadvantage; 
and (2) it covers up several very unattractive features of the second kind 
of research.  Because of these characteristics, we will likely see more 
 
 148. Id. at 109–10. 
 149. For an in-depth discussion, see Hoffman & O’Shea, supra note 1, at 340–72. 
 150. Id. at 347–56. 
 151. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Davis (Sept. 28, 1820), quoted in JOHN 
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 344–45 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (“I know no safe de-
pository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not 
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it 
from them, but to inform their discretion.”).  In my earlier article with Michael O’Shea, we discussed 
the work of Jonathan Baron, a psychology professor at the University of Pennsylvania.  See Hoffman 
& O’Shea, supra note 1, at 404–07, 415–18.  Baron argues that “[u]tilitarianism often conflicts with our 
intuitive beliefs about what is morally right.”  Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judg-
ments, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 109, 111 (Mellers & Baron eds., 1993).  How-
ever, Baron believes that people are capable of being educated to accept utilitarian arguments.  See 
JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 
196 (1998). 
 152. Sunstein et al., Deterrence, supra note 16, at 250. 
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books like Punitive Damages:  full of data about individual behavior that 
mix evidence of irrationality and evidence of tastes against utilitarianism.  
And, because of the seductive nature of the rationality debate, we will 
likely see critiques of this data that focus on methodology and rationality, 
instead of morality and legal theory. 
While the evidence of irrationality I describe in part I is likely to be 
important ammunition in political and legal battles, data like that I de-
scribe in part II is unlikely to be seen often outside the pages of academic 
law reviews.153  This absence will deprive defenders of democratic deci-
sion making of an important weapon in their fight to preserve ancient, 
and constitutionally mandated, institutions like the civil jury. 
 
 153. Cf. Adam Liptak, Debate Grows on Jury’s Role in Injury Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, 
at A1 (relying on the book and on Professors Sunstein and Viscusi for support of view that jury deci-
sions are not sensible or reliable, without mention of jury’s explicit reactions to efficiency); Readings, 
WASH. POST, May 5, 2002, at H3 (summarizing the book by stating it is not fair or cost-effective to rely 
on jurors because they are easily swayed and mete out inconsistent verdicts).  But cf. Bruce Fein, All 
Rise, the Jury Is Deciding, WASH. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A21.  Fein describes the Punitive Damages’ 
conclusion as follows: 
Their findings generally confirm . . . that jury awards are erratic, hitting like lightening bolts; that 
juries favor local plaintiffs over carpetbaggers; that jurors routinely ignore the legal standards for 
punitive damages; that when injuries appear, no matter how serendipitous, jurors are inclined to 
find predictability by the defendant to alleviate plaintiff losses.  And, defendants whose cases 
pivot on a cold cost/benefit appraisal of the worth of a human life are more harshly punished than 
the non-calculating businessman. 
